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Since the formation of the European Project, the questions of which direction the EU 
should take and what objectives it should pursue in the face of considerable ongoing challenges 
have evolved over time.  Today the Western Balkan states – the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM), Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania and Bosnia-Hercegovina – pose a 
set of considerable challenges to the organization, and how the EU addresses the membership of 
these countries will stand as a critical test of the organization’s competence.  As the Union turns 
its attention to membership consideration for these states, both their complexities and their 
fragilities have created among EU member states grave doubts regarding the efficacy of 
membership for all.  The critical issues include internal ethnic hostilities, faltering economies, 
the strain of refugee influx, regional political strains, and Soviet and Chinese economic and 
political intervention.  This thesis assesses both the benefits and costs of enlargement into the 
Balkan region for both the countries seeking membership and the European Union. This thesis 
argues that the Union should support enlargement only if it specifically serves the interests of the 
organization.  The Union should promote enlargement when it strengthens measurably deeper 
integration policies. Successfully adding some or all of the Balkans states would significantly 
enhance the EU’s international standing, broaden the reach of the organization, and 






The European Union is at a critical tipping point as it wrestles with the fallout of a series 
of blows that have called into question the future of the Union. Faced with the rise of 
Euroscepticism, the departure of one of its most prominent member states, and a number of 
security threats, the EU must decide how it is going to move forward. Should it look to deepen its 
political and economic ties in the region or should it seek to expand membership into 
neighboring countries? By looking at the history of the European Union, this thesis will study the 
benefits and challenges of European enlargement and its effects on European integration. 
Additionally, this thesis will utilize the Western Balkan region as a case study to further analyze 
the practical implications of expanding the European Union.   
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I. Introduction: 
The concept of European integration has long been a part of the European project. Some 
scholars view European integration as a necessary, almost inevitable, component of the Union’s 
overall success as it helps to foster a sense of cooperation and interdependence among member 
states. More specifically, both economic and political integration have worked together in an 
effort to form the “ever closer union” that many officials have been striving to attain— though to 
what extent integration should supersede national sovereignty remains a major point of 
contention. As a whole, integration has tended to occur in waves, and has particularly accelerated 
since the early 1980s.1  
In recent years, however, scholars have raised questions regarding the long-term viability 
of the European Union (EU).  The EU, according to Bieber and Kmezić, has “moved into great 
uncertainty, and this uncertainty threatens to unravel some of the pillars of stability on the 
European continent that have been in place for decades”.2 Faced with the aftermath of the 
Eurozone Crisis, the rising tension over how to handle the first departure of a major member 
state, and the uncertainty of the refugee crisis, members worry about the organization’s 
economic and political stability.  
Two distinct schools of thought regarding integration contribute to the debate over how 
to address these current issues. The first group of scholars call for deepening European 
integration, which essentially means that the Union should focus solely on identifying and 
solving the problems at hand without expanding integration outward. The second solution— 
                                                 
1 "Timeline of EU Integration". 2018. Civitas: Institute for the Study of Civil Society. 
http://www.civitas.org.uk/eu-facts/eu-overview/timeline-of-eu-integration/. 
2 Bieber, Florian, and Marko Kmezić. 2016. "EU Enlargement in The Western Balkans In a Time 
of Uncertainty". http://www.biepag.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/EU-Enlargement-in-the-
Western-Balkans-in-a-Time-of-Uncertainty.pdf. 
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which is the focus of this thesis— is to widen European integration by enlarging the EU’s 
geopolitical stance and solidifying its strength through numbers. In the past, the policy of 
widening integration has been the most commonly accepted and pursued in European politics.  
Currently, however, policy-makers and scholars have shifted away from this policy. This has 
occurred for two major reasons. The European Parliament’s briefing on the issues and challenges 
of the Western Balkans’ relationship with the EU states clearly states this shift in policy:  
“First, the EU itself is in a different situation. In 2014, the European Commission's newly 
elected president announced a five-year halt to enlargement.  In June 2016, the UK voted 
to leave the EU, an event unprecedented in Union history. Second, the Western Balkan 
countries present a case more complex than previous EU candidates, because apart from 
making a difficult transition to democracy while struggling economically, they face the 
legacy of relatively recent armed conflict and have bilateral disputes to resolve…”.3 
 
Ultimately, the main goal of the EU is to become stronger, more resilient, and more 
attractive to potential candidate countries. Therefore, while the EU has affirmed that the 
integration of the Western Balkans remains a goal of both sides, this complex situation poses 
serious challenges, and the prospect of future enlargement appears to be no more than a distant 
dream. Consequently, in a time of crisis, the unanswered question remains:  Should the EU 
double down on its efforts to admit the Balkan states into the Union, or does this region pose too 
much of a risk to the unity of the other 28 (soon to be 27) member states? 
 
II. Literature Review— a Historical and Theoretical Overview of European 
Integration: 
 
The EU today is “based on a series of treaties, pacts, and agreements between [sic] 
member states, which have steadily increased the areas in which nation states in the EU are 
                                                 
3 Lilyanova, Velina. 2018. "The Western Balkans And The EU: Enlargement and Challenges - 
Think Tank". European Parliament Think Tank. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2016)58979. 
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integrated”.4 In essence, individual states have pooled their sovereignty in order to make certain 
policy decisions at the European level, rather than at the level of each individual state.  The 
original quite monumental idea of creating a ‘united Europe’ has continued to expand in scope 
and size since its inception— unifying a continent around a common goal in spite of its 
fragmented history.  
 The story of European integration, as it is understood today, began in 1945. In the 
Community of Europe: A History of Integration Since 1945, Derek W. Urwin charts the course of 
European political and economic integration.  He begins his analysis with the European ideal of 
ending its history of regional political fragmentation by unifying the continent under a single 
organization.  Urwin reviews each of the major EU treaties and integration efforts conducted 
through 2014. He concludes his book with an assessment of the mood and prospects of Europe 
and the community today.  
The Union initially sought to end the frequent and devastating wars between neighbors 
that eventually culminated in the Second World War.5 In 1950, six countries – Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – formed the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC).6  In 1957 the six founding countries signed the Treaty of Rome, which 
created the European Economic Community (EEC), or the European ‘Common Market’, and the 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).7 The creation of the EEC marked the first step 
in creating an integrated economic system. Between 1957 and 1986 six more countries joined the 
organization.  Consequently, the EU markedly enhanced its regional integration, which led to the 
                                                 
4 "Timeline of EU Integration". 2016. Civitas: Institute for the Study of Civil Society. 
http://www.civitas.org.uk/eu-facts/eu-overview/timeline-of-eu-integration/. 
5 "The History of The European Union - European Union - European Commission". 2018. 
European Union. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
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signing of the 1986 Single European Act (SEA).  The SEA “provided the basis for a vast 
program aimed at sorting out the problems with the free flow of trade across EU borders” and in 
turn created the ‘Single Market’.8 The 1990s produced two important treaties: the ‘Maastricht’ 
Treaty on European Union in 1993 and the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999.9 These treaties gave 
rise to the European Union as it is known today and instated the Euro as the official currency of 
the European Union. Other notable EU policies include the Schengen Agreement which 
abolished the EU’s internal border checks, and the Treaty of Lisbon which provided the EU with 
modern institutions and more efficient working methods. Ultimately, each wave of EU 
integration has been both a response to the needs of the time and an effort to continue creating a 
unified union within continental Europe.   
 In the Origins and Development of the European Union 1945-1995: A History of 
European Integration, Martin Dedman accomplishes many of the same goals as other European 
scholars. Through a historical analysis of Europe post-1945, Dedman crafts a concise 
introduction on the history of European unity and integration. Additionally, Dedman looks at the 
EU through a broader lens and assesses both the political and economic incentives for 
establishing supranational organizations in the modern age.  Dedman’s work, however, falls 
short of a complete history and analysis of European integration as its timeframe ends in 1995. 
Consequently, his work has become dated because it concludes before crucial transition period 
following the Eastern enlargement boom of 2004 and the ensuing 2008 financial crisis.  
 In addition to the historical analyses of integration, a variety of theoretical perspectives 
have helped to shape the academic opinions of EU scholars. These theories seek explanations of 
how and why the European Union came about and how it progresses today. For example, neo-
                                                 
8 Ibid., 5.  
9 Ibid.  
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functionalism offers the process of political spillover as an explanation of how the self-sustaining 
policy of integration came about.10 Intergovernmentalism, on the other hand, emphasizes “the 
role of the nation-state in integration and argues that the nation-state is not becoming obsolete 
due to [sic] increased European integration”.11 This theory is particularly important to the future 
prospects of enlargement because member-state involvement has slowly and continually changed  
the motivation and criteria for the accession process. Civitas, an independent research 
organization, compiled a list of the five most dominant theories of European integration— 
neofunctionlism, intergovermentalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, (new) institutionalism, and 
multi-level governance— and analyzed how they influence individual perspectives on current 
integration efforts. More specifically, it charts when each of these theories was most prevalent in 
European history and helps to explain why certain integration efforts have proven to be more 
popular at certain times than at others.  
Another crucial component of the history and theoretical nature of European integration 
is the concept of European enlargement. According to Stefan Frölick, “enlargement is part of the 
success story of the EU and has been a key driver of and a triggering factor for further 
integration efforts”.12 Therefore, rather than simply looking at European integration and 
European enlargement as two distinct EU policy platforms, he stresses the importance of 
analyzing how the two ideas work together to further the goals of the European Union. In The 
Future of Europe— Integration and Enlargement, Fraser Cameron argues that “the EU has 
progressed since its creation through a mixture of both widening and deepening, in other words it 
                                                 
10 "Theories of European Integration". 2018. Civitas: Institute for The Study Of Civil Society. 
http://www.civitas.org.uk/eu-facts/eu-overview/theories-of-european-integration/. 
11 Ibid.  
12 Brimmer, Esther, and Stefan Fröhlich. 2005. The Strategic Implications of European Union 
Enlargement. Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, the Paul H. Nitze School of 
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. 
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has taken steps towards closer integration at the same time as it has enlarged”.13 Since the 1950s 
the European community has witnessed seven enlargements: in 1973 Britain, Ireland and 
Demark joined; in 1981 Greece; in 1986 Spain and Portugal; in 1995 Austria, Sweden and 
Finland joined; in 2004 Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Hungary joined; in 2007 Bulgaria and Romania; and in 2013 Croatia.14 
Fraser argues that each round of enlargement has been accompanied by moves forward in the 
process of integration.15 For example, the first enlargement was preceded by a common fisheries 
policy and eventually led to the EU adopting a more cohesive regional policy.16 The second and 
third enlargements led to the signing of the Single European Act (SEA)— the first major treaty 
reform since 1957. The SEA was significant because it laid the foundations for the completion of 
the single market in 1992.17 These enlargements also led to a stronger social policy, an increased 
commitment to solidarity with the poor regions of Europe, and increased powers for the 
European Parliament.18 The fourth enlargement “followed moves towards economic and 
monetary union and new policy areas in foreign policy and justice and home affairs”19. The fifth 
enlargement occurred when the EU faced major challenges concerning its democratic legitimacy, 
its internal cohesion and efficiency, its economic performance, and its external role.20 However, 
even in the face of these challenges, the EU was able to introduce its single currency (the Euro) 
on the eve of its largest enlargement endeavor to date. From the moment the EU began to reunite 
continental Europe and expand into the east, its institutional framework began to change. It has 
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caused growing pains, but the push for deeper integration continued without interruption.  In 
fact, in many cases, enlargement has actually been a driving force behind the EU’s integration 
efforts.  
Thus, as the Union’s current enlargement prospects grow, the inevitable eastward 
expansion of the EU’s borders will continue to shape the Union’s very nature and chemistry. It 
will further intensify the debates on the scope of the European Union, its future, the degree of 
integration, and its geographical limits.21 It will call into question the nature of European 
identity. But this debate is not new.  The conversations have existed since the inception of the 
European Union. The real issue with Eastern enlargement, according to Ulrike Guérot in his The 
Strategic Implications of European Union Enlargement, is the strategic impact of enlargement 
on the “Old EU”.22 More specifically, the 2004 Eastern Enlargement, known as the “Big Bang”,  
no doubt the biggest enlargement in European history, marked a historically unprecedented 
achievement both in scope and in diversity and reunited Europe into a stronger, more democratic 
continent.23 Consequently, it also created a watershed effect within the Union on future 
enlargement prospects and ultimately opened ‘Pandora’s Box’.24   
Prior to the accession of the ten new eastern member states, discussion about potential 
new enlargement rounds had already begun.  Indeed, only a few months after the “Big Bang”, 
Turkey got green lights for the opening of accession talks in October 2005; the European 
Parliament adopted a resolution requesting a membership perspective for Ukraine in January 
                                                 
21 Brimmer, Esther, and Stefan Fröhlich. 2005. The Strategic Implications of European Union 
Enlargement. Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, the Paul H. Nitze School of 
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. 
22 Ibid.  
23 Cameron, Fraser. 2004. The Future of Europe. London: Routledge. 
24 Brimmer, Esther, and Stefan Fröhlich. 2005. The Strategic Implications of European Union 
Enlargement. Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, the Paul H. Nitze School of 
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. 
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2005; and other countries like Georgia did not miss a single opportunity to express their 
perspective for membership.25 Thus, this new fast-tracked view on eastern expansion put into 
question the very undertaking of European integration, especially the notion of further political 
integration along the lines of ‘an ever closer union’.26 According to Guérot, many of the “Old 
EU” member states who never had warm feelings about deeper European integration would  now 
hide behind the new difficulties and challenges to claim the project’s end.  And, as time has 
passed, clearly Guérot’s analysis has proven to be true.27 His chapter argues that Europe as a 
whole is becoming a scapegoat for domestic frustrations. It is not a “young, dynamic, innovative 
and rich European Union that is confronted with— cost-generating — enlargement, but an ‘old’ 
Europe that is over-aging and economically stagnant”.28 With the rise of nationalist tendencies 
and right-wing movements, many voices in the old member states firmly believe that the end of 
political integration has come and that the only way forward is to move away from progressive 
new reform and revert back to a crisis-management model.  
 Still, while many scholars have argued that the Union has entered into a period of 
“enlargement fatigue”, the continued prospects of greater international clout is enough to keep 
the idea of European enlargement at the forefront of any major EU discussion. According to the 
authors of The Strategic Implications of European Union Enlargement, the political implications 
of creating a finite Europe present too many security risks to be a permanent solution.29 Various 
scholars have analyzed how geopolitical factors affect enlargement and agree on the Union’s 
prospects both on a regional and international scale. Moreover, while Europe continues to handle 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 9.  
26 Ibid.   
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid.  
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its domestic problems, it continues to look for ways to expand its geopolitical stance in the 
world. The various authors of The Strategic Implications of European Union Enlargement define 
the EU as an organization that desires to be relevant in the international sphere both 
economically and as a contributor to global security efforts.  Two central schools of thought 
contribute perspectives regarding the relationship between European enlargement and Europe’s 
geopolitical standing in the world. One view— the Euro-optimist school— sees EU enlargement 
as “an evolutionary step in the making of a prosperous Europe whole and free”.30 For Euro-
optimists, successive enlargements are logical extensions of the post-World War II European 
project. They believe that as the EU expands its role as a critical global actor will grow stronger 
and more relevant. 
 The second school of thought— the Euro-pessimist view – stresses the challenges 
associated with EU enlargement.31 Most proponents of this school argue that reconciling  
national interests of an ever-growing number of member states with that of the organization as a 
whole will become increasingly difficult.32 Moreover, they argue that the difference between and 
small and large member states and unequal economic development within the union will lead to 
increasing friction and minimalist EU policies— thus decreasing the role of the EU as a global 
actor.33  
 In A Larger EU: A More Effective Actor in the United Nations, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat 
makes a case for an alternative third view— the Euro-pragmatic view. This perspective argues 
that the “push for successive EU enlargement is unstoppable and at the core of the European 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 10.  
31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid.  
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project”.34 This project seeks to promote liberal democracy, “not as a monopoly of West 
Europeans but as [a] strongly to be preferred system to be defended against competing models in 
the immediate neighborhood”.35 Thus, while enlargement inevitably complicates decision-
making processes and raises collective-action problems, the challenge is not whether or not the 
EU should abandon enlargement prospects, but rather how to make the best of an “inevitable, 
inherently difficult, but potentially transformative situation”.36  
Through an analysis of European integration from both a historical and a theoretical 
perspective, a clear link exists between “deepening” integration efforts and “widening” the 
Union through enlargement. The literature on this particular topic is expansive, and European 
scholars have analyzed each of the past enlargements in relation to their effects on the European 
Union as a whole. Significantly fewer scholars, however, have examined the future effects of 
potential enlargement opportunities— particularly in regard to the Western Balkan region. While 
many scholars have speculated regarding the future relationship between this region and the EU, 
few have assessed the question of how enlargement into the Western Balkans could potentially 
shape the organization’s push toward deeper social and political integration. This thesis will 
begin to fill that scholarly gap by assessing the benefits and challenges of European integration 
through enlargement by conducting a case study on the organization’s enlargement prospects 
into the Western Balkans. More specifically, this thesis will critically assess the current 
enlargement process and evaluate the Balkans both as a geographical region and as individual 
states in terms of how they can aid Europe— economically, politically, and socially— in its most 
recent push for a more integrated and “ever closer” union. 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 11.  
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid.   
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III. The Enlargement Process— Mapping the Way to European Accession: 
 
The EU enlargement process is tedious and technical, and it involves so much more than 
just territorial expansion of EU membership rights, privileges, and obligations to other European 
states. According to Christophe Hillion, “enlargement also triggers new policy demands on the 
Union, alters its institutional functioning, and affects its legal corpus”.37 Thus, the process is 
highly politicized and requires the organization to operate under “comprehensive approval 
procedures that ensure new members are admitted only when they can demonstrate they will be 
able to play their part fully”.38 Future member states must comply with all of the EU’s standards 
and rules. Additionally, future member states must have the consent of the EU institutions and 
other EU member states, and they must have the consent of their own citizens— gained through 
expressed parliamentary approval or a state-wide referendum process.39 Still, a willingness to 
abide by the rules and the expressed consent of all parties involved is not enough to grant a 
country access to the European Union.  
 More specifically, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) sets out the conditions (Article 
49) and principles (Article 6(1)) to which any country wishing to the become an EU member 
must conform.40 In 1993 the Copenhagen European Council established these criteria, known as 
the Copenhagen Criteria.  Two years later the Madrid European Council furthered strengthened 
these criteria.41 They include:  
                                                 
37 Hillion, Christophe. 2011. “EU Enlargement”. Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies.  
38 "Conditions for Membership - European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations - 
European Commission". 2018. European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations. 
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/conditions-membership_en. 
39 Ibid.  
40 "Accession Criteria (Copenhagen Criteria) - EUR-Lex". 2018. Eur-Lex.Europa.Eu. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague.html. 
41 Ibid. 
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1. stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, 
and respect for and protection of minorities; 
2. a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure 
and market forces within the EU; 
3. the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including the capacity to 
effectively implement the rules, standards, and policies that make up the body of 
EU law (the ‘acquis’), and adherence to the aims of political, economic, and 
monetary union.42 
 
Most importantly, the EU needs to have the ability to absorb new members into the organization 
without sacrificing the momentum of integration. Therefore, in the case of some countries, such 
as the candidate countries of the Western Balkans, additional conditions for membership were 
outlined in the “Stabilization and Association Process” (SAP). The SAP sets out “common 
political and economic goals”, but progress evaluation is based on each country’s own merits.43 
SAP put these conditions in place in order to facilitate regional cooperation and good neighborly 
relations among the Western Balkan countries with the long-term intention of stabilizing the 
region politically and establishing a free-trade area.   
 Once a country has been offered the prospect of membership and has satisfied the first 
criterion, the country officially becomes a candidate country and accession negotiations can be 
launched. Throughout the negotiation period, the conditions and timing of the candidate’s 
adoption, implementation, and enforcement of all EU rules are established.44 These rules are then 
divided into 35 different chapters— such as transport, energy, and education — and negotiated 
separately. The European Commission keeps the EU Council and the European Parliament 
                                                 
42 Ibid., 13.  
43 "Conditions for Membership - European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations - 
European Commission". 2018. European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations. 
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/conditions-membership_en. 
44 Ibid. 
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informed throughout the process and monitors the candidate state’s progress in applying EU 
legislation and fulfilling any benchmark requirements.45 
The EU enlargement process, however, has evolved over time— influencing not only 
how a country can join the EU, but also which countries are allowed to join. What was once 
hailed as “the most successful EU foreign policy”, enlargement has been marked with 
shortcomings that have weakened its credibility, effectiveness, and legitimacy.46 Motivated by 
the past experiences of some candidate states’ “lack of preparedness for admission, mounting 
doubts about the systemic sustainability of further expansion, and increased demands for 
democratic accountability”, adjustments have been made in recent years.47  On the whole, these 
changes have entailed the strengthening of member states’ control over the conduct of the policy. 
While not always a bad thing, this newfound control has caused the enlargement process to be 
dominated, and in some cases held hostage, by national agendas. Thus, instead of analyzing 
potential candidate prospects from a purely objective set of criteria, the nationalization of 
enlargement has introduced a whole host of legal and political hurdles to the accession process. 
This new development has not only slowed down the accession process, but it has also raised 
new questions as to the credibility of the EU commitments towards aspirant states, and 
consequently the effectiveness of the enlargement policy’s “acclaimed transformative powers”.48  
In addition, the EU has expanded the role of conditionality at all stages of the 
enlargement process. More specifically, in an effort to mitigate concerns related to ill-prepared 
candidate states and public disenchantment, both the Commission and the Council agreed to an 
                                                 
45 Ibid., 14.   
46 Hillion, Christophe. 2010. "The Creeping Nationalization of The EU Enlargement Policy". 
Sieps.Se. http://www.sieps.se/en/publications/2010/the-creeping-nationalisation-of-the-eu-
enlargement-policy-20106/Sieps_2010_6.pdf. 
47 Ibid.  
48 Ibid.  
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“enlargement strategy based on consolidation, conditionality, and communication”.49 This 
conditionality has manifested itself in a variety of ways, but one of the most notable 
manifestations is the creation of a “benchmark” criteria. On the basis of a Commission 
recommendation, the Council may define “benchmarks” that the candidate state has to meet in 
order for the EU to open and/or close a particular negotiating chapter.50 According to the 2006 
Commission document:  
“Benchmarks are a new tool introduced as a result of lessons learnt from the fifth 
enlargement. Their purpose is to improve the quality of the negotiations, by providing 
incentives for the candidate countries to undertake necessary reforms at an early stage. 
Benchmarks are measurable and linked to key elements of the acquis chapter.”51   
 
Non-fulfillment of these pre-defined benchmarks may lead to the suspension of negotiations and 
can stall the negotiations for an indefinite amount of time. The connection between 
conditionality and negotiations is not entirely new to the enlargement process.52 In fact, the start 
of the accession negotiations is almost always subject to the fulfillment of specific conditions— 
many of which are now enshrined in the TEU. However, the introduction of specific benchmark 
requirements significantly strengthens the overall use of more stringent conditionality in the 
benchmark process and calls into question whether candidate states are making actual progress in 
embedding EU norms into their societies, or if they are simply ticking off check boxes to 
appease the other side. From the perspective of EU member states, this process works as an 
emergency brake for potential enlargement growing pains. It gives them more control over who 
gains access to the Union, and it affords dissenting states the opportunity to stop negotiations 
until the organization meets their concerns. However, this control has led to unpredictability in 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 15.  
50 Ibid.  
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid.  
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the process and an abuse of power by many current member states. In some cases, member states 
using their relative power have high-jacked the enlargement process in order to settle a bilateral 
dispute.53 For example, in the case of Greece and (the former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia, 
Greece prevented the opening of accession negotiations, despite the favorable recognition of the 
Commission. Ultimately, evidence from research supports neither the current benchmark 
approach to conditionality nor the nationalization of the enlargement process as effective 
mechanisms for encouraging and measuring real and sustainable change in candidate countries.54 
Regardless of the effectiveness of the evolving enlargement process, however, these are the 
parameters that the Western Balkan countries— and any future candidate country— will have to 
contend with as they seek access to the European Union. 
IV. The EU & the Western Balkans— From Yugoslavia to EU Candidate States: 
 
The Balkans have been the major testing ground of the European Union’s developing 
international role and in particular its common foreign and security policy (CFSP).55 Though the 
Western Balkans have long been plagued with regional conflict and strong ethnic divisions, the 
violence that ensued between 1991-1999 in the Balkan peninsula created the largest death toll 
and the worst refugee crisis that Europe has seen since World War II. While Europeans viewed 
this conflict as a test of their ability to resolve security crises, they lacked the cohesion, 
determination, and instruments to bring the crisis under control.56 Thus, as the bloodshed 
worsened, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), led by the US, intervened and 
resolved the conflict. In 1995 the United States bombed Serbia into acceptance of a peace deal 
                                                 
53 Ibid., 16.   
54 Ibid.  
55 Blitz, Brad K. 2006. War and Change in the Balkans: Nationalism, Conflict and Cooperation. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
56 Ibid.  
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signed in Dayton, Ohio.57 Four years later the EU again failed to play a determining role in the 
Kosovo conflict.58 Although the EU’s overall cohesion had improved, the EU lacked the military 
capabilities to end the conflict and was forced to watch as NATO, once again headed by the US, 
took control of the situation. By all accounts, the EU’s reaction to the Yugoslav wars 
embarrassed its leaders; however, following the end of the conflict, the EU’s Balkan policy 
“became more coherent and proactive and the US-European relationship in the Balkans shifted 
towards greater equality”.59 In 2000 the European Union crafted a comprehensive new policy 
approach for the Balkan region known as the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). 
Simply put, this process not only continued to deploy the EU’s foreign policy and crisis 
management strategies in order to promote the stabilization of the region, but it held out the 
promise of future association and membership opportunities for the Balkan states.60  
 In June 2003, in Thessalonica, the EU reemphasized its commitment of association by 
bringing together all of the respective parties at the EU-Western Balkans Summit. With this 
meeting, the EU declared that the future of the Balkans would be in the EU, and stated that the 
region’s future candidates for membership must affirm fully their commitment to the goals of the 
EU by advancing down the road to reform. The purpose of the ‘enriched’ EU partnership with 
these countries was to “establish clear benchmarks to assess progress and lay the basis for a 
policy of conditionality in relation to increased financial assistance and the prospect of accession 
negotiations”.61 It also linked the step-by-step implementation of the SAP to the EU’s influence 
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in the region— affording the organization the opportunity to reduce the likelihood of conflicts 
and shaping the Balkan peninsula into future members of Europe.  
Since the EU asserted this new commitment to the Western Balkans, however, it has 
faced a variety of institutional challenges, including the 2008 financial crisis, the looming 
departure of Britain from the EU, the rise of nationalist parties in EU member states, and the 
ongoing refugee crisis. This tipping point has forced EU officials to reevaluate their future goals. 
In 2014 European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker announced a five-year halt on 
enlargement. This distancing of the membership prospects in favor of enhanced regional and 
economic integration efforts forced German Chancellor Angela Merkel to create the 'Berlin 
process' in an attempt to salvage the EU’s relationship with the Balkan region and keep the hope 
of membership alive. Consisting of yearly high-level meetings between the six Western Balkan 
governments and several EU member states between 2014 and 2018, this process aims to 
reaffirm the region's EU perspective by improving cooperation and economic stability within it.62 
Currently, Merkel’s “Berlin Process” appears to be working, but many observers contend 
that time is running out for the EU to make a tangible move in the Balkans. Overcoming a 
decade of “enlargement fatigue” the latest plan unveils the Union’s new strategy for the region 
and projects that it might be able to offer some states membership by 2025. The frontrunners to 
join are Montenegro and Serbia, with Albania, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Kosovo and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia lagging.  All Western Balkan states have expressed impatience 
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and annoyance at the EU’s putting expansion on hold.63 Moreover, EU officials broadly disagree 
over the executive’s push to expand into the Western Balkans. Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko 
Borisov, for example, recently warned that it was “now or never for expanding the EU into the 
Balkans” as concerns grow about Moscow’s influence in the bloc’s eastern backyard.64 
Hungary’s Peter Szijjarto was “very much disappointed” by that 2025 target, arguing that the 
first two countries from the Western Balkan six should be admitted by 2022.65 Both of these 
officials stressed that EU entry would help relieve tensions between neighbors in a region that 
sits on the bloc’s doorstep.66 To make matters more difficult for the Western Balkans states, 
Germany, the EU’s leading power, has expressed reluctance to commit to any timeline on 
account of rule-of-law shortcomings in some of the current newer member states of the 
organization.  Sharing the same hesitant opinions of France and Slovenia, Germany holds that 
much works needs to be done before the Western Balkans can be seriously considered for 
membership.  
 Overall, the EU currently has a stronger profile in the Balkans than ever before. Years of 
the SAP process and financial contributions have produced significant progress to validate the 
overall policy approach.  Opening the perspective of EU membership to the region has had some 
important successes— including increased economic growth and overall stabilization.  All of 
these countries, however, continue to face significant structural challenges. The stability of the 
region remains intrinsically linked to the European Union, and the organization’s credibility as 
an international actor depends on its success in the Balkans. Therefore, it is critical that the EU 
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continues to look for ways to fulfill its commitment to the Balkans in a timely fashion without 
compromising its membership standard or the effectiveness of reforms. 
 
V. A Closer Look— an Individual Analysis of Each Prospective Balkan State:  
 
The Western Balkan states present the EU with a unique situation. Given the region’s 
long history of conflict, the EU has designed policies that foster a sense of regional cooperation. 
Hence when the EU implements strategies in the Balkans it tends to do so in a sweeping manner 
and under the pretense of uniting the region with a common goal. Still, while Europeans tend to 
discuss the Western Balkan states as a collective unit, it designs policies and responses to each 
individual Balkan state on its own merits.  Unlike the 2004 enlargement, the EU will likely avoid 
a situation in which it would admit all six remaining Balkan countries at one time. Indeed, the 
European Union is not looking toward a “Balkan Boom” in which a single enlargement would be 
dramatic and sweeping.  Each Balkan country is reforming at a different pace, and each one will 
join the EU only when it has met all of the necessary criteria. Thus, to understand the 
implications of Western Balkan enlargement for the European Union, it is essential to analyze 
each prospective country individually, as each one brings its own benefits and challenges to 
future EU integration efforts.  
Montenegro 
 
Made up of a population of only 633,000, Montenegro is largely considered the front 
runner in the EU accession race.67 Despite not emerging as a sovereign state until 2006, 
Montenegro applied for full membership to the EU in 2008 and was confirmed as a candidate 
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country in 2010— although official negotiation talks did not begin until June 29th, 2012.68 While 
Montenegro still has a long way to go before its negotiations with the EU are complete, the 
country is recognized with making significant strides to acquiesce the demands of the European 
Union.  With 30 chapters open and widespread support among EU officials, the Montenegrin 
Foreign Minister expects that the country could join any time between 2022-2025. In fact, in its 
2016 assessment of the accession process, the European Commission has identified Montenegro 
as having the highest level of preparation among the candidate states.69 However, in order to gain 
admission, the EU says that Montenegro must, “intensify its efforts to consolidate the rule of 
law, fight organized crime and corruption, and protect freedom of expression”.70 
The accession of Montenegro would have little overall impact on the EU— which is why, 
out of the remaining Balkan states, it is forecasted to gain access to the EU first. Not only does 
the country already use the Euro, but its small population size would mean that the country 
would have minimal institutional influence particularly in the European Parliament. The addition 
of Montenegro’s economy would have a positive, albeit minor, effect on the EU’s overall GDP, 
and in comparison with the remaining Balkan states it has few bilateral disputes that would lead 
to future tensions in the region. Additionally, the Montenegrin people are largely Euro-positive, 
and are very excited about the prospects of their country joining the EU. According to a recent 
public opinion poll, more than three-quarters of Montenegro's citizens (76.5 percent) would turn 
out to vote in a referendum on joining the European Union.71 Of the total number of decided 
citizens who would vote – those who at the time of the poll had a clear position on this issue – 
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80.9 percent would vote YES, while only a quarter of that number (19.1 percent) would opt for 
NO.72 This is particularly relevant because at a time when the EU is faced with the rise of 
Euroscepticism and the departure of one of its largest member states, it is increasingly important 
to offer membership to states that want to be a part of the EU.  
Serbia 
 
Following Montenegro, Serbia is predicted to be the next Western Balkan country to join 
the EU. However, Serbia’s progress has been sluggish and greatly hindered by its stance on 
Kosovo. While Serbia applied for membership in 2009, the EU granted it candidate status until 
2012.  Negotiations commenced two years later.  Incentivized by its desire for membership, the 
Serbian government has made strides in its tense relationship with Kosovo. Although it still 
refuses to recognize the sovereignty of Kosovo, the country did reach a landmark deal that 
allowed for the normalization of ties. Additionally, Serbia continues to cooperate with the 
international war crimes tribunal in The Hague. Serbia will unlikely gain admission to the EU 
prior to 2020— in fact the current trajectory date is 2025— but the Serbian government has 
carried out a number of reforms that have moved it closer to meeting the requirements of the EU.  
Serbia is a uniquely important candidate country. Although its economic contribution will 
have minimal impact on the overall GDP of the EU, its population size makes it one of the 
largest prospective Balkan countries. Thus, its institutional impact will be greater than that of 
Montenegro. In addition, its fragmented past— namely the independence movements in 
Montenegro and Kosovo— ensures that rivalry will continue to characterize the Balkan states. 
While this might appear to be a problem, Serbia’s commitment to EU membership demonstrates 
that it is willing to compromise on certain issues. Moreover, Serbia has always had a unique 
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historic tie to Russia. To this day, the country still views Russia in a positive light, and Russia 
uses this channel to their advantage. However, if Serbia willingly chooses to pursue the EU its 




Albania submitted its application for EU membership in 2009 and gained official 
candidate status in 2014. Negotiation on formal accession has not yet begun, and though 
Albanian officials are hopeful that they will start up soon, the EU has set no official timeline.  In 
the words of Albanian Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, “we know very well that it will 
take time, and we want to use this time to further transform our country in every sense and to 
bring citizens close to Europe”.73 In 2016 Albania sat at a crucial crossroads. Forced to choose 
between its historical legacy of corruption and the EU, the Albanian government implemented 
sweeping judicial legislation that has been called the one of the most important ongoing reforms 
in any of the enlargement countries. The next step will be to wait for the Commission to 
recommend the beginning of accession talks, but until then the EU Commissioner for 
Enlargement noted that Albania has to continue to “deliver the reforms in five key areas, 
identified as public administration, corruption, rule of law, organized crime and fundamental 
rights”.74 Albania has a long road ahead before it gains admission to the EU, and its track record 
is not helping. However, the EU’s willingness to keep the door to enlargement open and to 
                                                 
73Velebit, Vuk. 2018. "2018 as a Crucial Year for Albania on its European Path - European 
Western Balkans". European Western Balkans. 
https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2018/01/12/2018-crucial-year-albania-european-
path/.https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2018/01/12/2018-crucial-year-albania-european-path/. 
74 Ibid.  
 
   
 25 
continue pushing the Albanian government to crack down on corruption and implement reforms 
has proven to be a positive outcome of the process.  
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) 
 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) applied for EU membership in 
March 2004. The Commission issued a favorable opinion in November 2005, and in 2005 the 
Council agreed to grant the country candidate status. In spite of the ongoing need for reform, the 
European Commission reported that FYROM had made significant progress in “police reform, 
tackling corruption, and bolstering human rights”.75 The Macedonians had hoped that 
negotiations for EU accession would commence in 2008, but election violence and a subsequent 
boycott of parliament by ethnic Albanian opposition parties derailed this plan.76 In October 2009, 
the Commission finally recommended that accession negotiations be opened, but since this 
recommendation no chapters have opened or closed.  
 The biggest barrier to FYROM membership in the EU is its disputes with the EU member 
states of Greece and Macedonia. In the case of Greece, the two countries disagree over 
Macedonia’s name. While the United Nations admitted Macedonia in 1993 using the temporary 
name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece holds that the name “Macedonia” 
cannot be monopolized by one country. The Greek government argues that using the name 
“Macedonia” implies a territorial claim over the northern Greek region of the same name. In a 
2008 interview, however, Macedonian Foreign Minister Antonio Milososki said, "it is important 
that 125 countries worldwide have recognized Macedonia's constitutional name," and added: "we 
remain firm on our stance that only the Republic of Greece has a problem with Macedonia's 
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constitutional name".77 To complicate matters, the country of Bulgaria refuses to recognize 
“Macedonians” as a distinct ethnic group and therefore continues to block FYROM’s attempts to 
join the European Union. Simply put, these deeply rooted political issues present few solutions, 
particularly given the unwillingness to compromise on the part of the states party to the disputes.  
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is making great strides to conform to the 
requirements of the EU, and the EU wants this country to join. Thus, it is imperative that the EU 
encourage membership as a means to mediate some of these disputes. Though there is no target 
date for FYROM accession, both the EU and Macedonia could benefit greatly from the accession 
of Macedonia to the European Union. 
Bosnia-Hercegovina (BiH) 
 
Bosnia-Hercegovina remains one of the most troublesome Balkan states. Divided into 
two autonomous regions— the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosniak-Croat) and the 
Republika Srpska— the country is still plagued with ethnic tension and systematic corruption. 
Little progress has been made to meet the accession requirements of the European Union and it 
remains one of the poorest countries in the region. Moreover, while BiH was recognized as a 
potential candidate country in 2003, it did not apply for EU membership until 2016. The 
European Commission holds that Bosnia is “an unstable political climate” and the European 
Court of Humans Rights ruled that Bosnia’s judicial system is plagued with discriminatory 
policies that must be reformed.78 Ultimately, the domestic politics of BiH are the greatest barriers 
to EU membership, and without serious reform and commitment the Bosnian government will 
not be able to petition the EU to move forward on negotiations.  
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Although the accession of Bosnia-Hercegovina into the EU is not going to happen for 
quite a while, EU member states are concerned about the ongoing ethnic tensions and the 
increased levels of inter-European migrations that the West could see from Bosnia. Still, it is 
critical that the EU keep trying to influence the transformation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Ravaged 
by the years of mass violence in the Yugoslav Wars, BiH has been left war-torn and divided.  
Given the long road to recovery, the EU could play a critical role in helping to reshape the 
economic and political relationships across the region.  Moreover, as Serbia gets closer and 
closer to EU membership, Russia is looking for another Balkan state from which to assert its 
influence.  Recently Milorad Dodik, the Bosnian Serb leader, called for the break-up of Bosnia-
Hercegovina. The separatist praised the friendly, financial support of Russia and China without 
political attachments— unlike the EU— and argued that a break from the West is in the best 
interest of Bosnia.79 While Dodik’s rhetoric has gained little widespread support, the EU must 
aggressively implement a strategy of integration that assert’s the organization’s positive 
influence across the Balkan peninsula, particularly in BiH. Bosnia has a lot to gain from EU 
membership and, in spite of the recent setbacks, it must not give up on the country.  
Kosovo 
 
The Balkans breakaway territory of Kosovo is the last in the queue to join the EU 
because the international community remains split over its 2008 declaration of independence.80 
While many countries have recognized the sovereignty of Kosovo, the countries of Serbia, 
Russia, and China— along with 5 EU member states (Spain, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and 
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Cyprus)— have refused recognition. For more than a decade, the hostility between Belgrade and 
the Kosovan authorities in Pristina have held up consideration of a Kosovan EU bid.81 However, 
a 2013 deal brokered by the EU initiated the first steps in thawing the relationship between 
Serbia and Kosovo. In this deal, both sides pledged that they would not try to block the other’s 
EU bid. Still, the Serbian government refuses to acknowledge the sovereignty of Kosovo. 
Overall, the Commission has praised Pristina's co-operation with the EU law-and-order mission 
in Kosovo, called Eulex, but it has also called for further efforts to tackle human trafficking in 
Kosovo and the smuggling of drugs and illegal weapons by gangs.82 In addition, protection of 
minority rights and freedom of speech are also significant challenges that Kosovo must address 
in order to gain consideration for EU membership. The Kosovan leadership has made significant 
strides in implementing reforms into the political, economic, and legal systems of Kosovo, but its 
membership is still contingent on a resolution with Serbia regarding its independence.  
Kosovo is perhaps the keenest of the Balkan states to join the EU. A small, landlocked 
country with few natural resources and a newly acquired independence, the country has 
explicitly stated that it wishes to become a fully integrated member of the European Union. Its 
population has remained broadly supportive of EU membership.  Nevertheless, Kosovo faces 
many challenges, including border issues, charges of war crimes, and a sovereignty dispute with 
Serbia. Kosovo will need to satisfy each of these demands before the process can really move 
forward. Unfortunately, Kosovo sits at the crux of many key issues for two of the Balkan 
frontrunners for EU membership— Serbia and Montenegro. Thus, its membership prospects are 
plagued with politics and special conditions. Despite the fact that Kosovo is the most excited of 
the Balkan Six about EU membership, it is likely that it will end up being the last to join. 
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Unresolved bilateral disputes have been persistent hurdles for all of the Western Balkan 
governments on their path toward EU accession, and each dispute poses a risk of renewed 
instability and further delays domestic reforms. The Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group 
(BiEPAG) organizes the region’s bilateral disputes into three categories: border disputes, 
political disputes, and minority-rights disputes.83 While border disputes in the region primarily 
concern the demarcation of borders after the break-up of Yugoslavia, political disputes and 
minority-rights disputes concern national identity and are thus highly sensitive issues that need to 
be handled accordingly. The most prominent examples of political disputes are those involving 
Kosovo and Serbia as well as the longstanding name dispute between FYR Macedonia and 
Greece.84 Still, the general consensus among the Western Balkan states is that these bilateral 
issues pose little risk to regional stability but continue to derail the Balkan accession process and 
democratic transformation. Therefore, in the spirit of good neighborliness and shared 
commitment to EU integration, the governments of the Western Balkan states agreed to “not 
block, or encourage others to block” the progress of neighbors on their respective EU paths.85 In 
spite of this agreement, quite a few bilateral disputes remain that have yet to be resolved, and the 
EU has stuck by its declaration that the Union would not import these problems into its 
organization. However, the commitment to regional cooperation by the Balkans remains a step in 
the right direction and serves as further encouragement that with some help from the EU, the 
future of the Western Balkans in Europe looks promising. 
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VI. A Case for Continued European Enlargement— What the Balkans Can Contribute 
to Europe: 
 
The current debate for European enlargement comes at a critical time for the Union. As 
stated previously, the EU is at a tipping point. While many promote extensive and rapid 
enlargement as a means for strengthening and legitimizing the organization at a time when many 
question its long-term viability, others argue for more cautious.  They contend that a focus on 
greater ties and not on broader membership is a more prudent approach.  Both EU officials and 
EU citizens are concerned about the future direction their organization will take.  Is now the 
appropriate time for another enlargement? For the past decade, the EU has endured what some 
scholars have labeled “enlargement fatigue”. Negotiations in many areas have stalled, prospects 
have dimmed, and the once enthusiastic future members were told that it was unlikely they 
would gain access to the EU anytime soon. However, as Europe sits at the crossroads of its 
future, there is a clear argument for enlargement, particularly cautious interest-driven 
enlargement into the Western Balkans, that should be made. More specifically, enlargement into 
this region is ultimately in the best interests of the EU for three key reasons.  First, it 
demonstrates the strength of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy through successful 
state-building and regional security efforts.  Second, it introduces valuable partner states in the 
ongoing refugee crisis.  Finally, it secures Europe’s geopolitical stance in the face of encroaching 
Russian/Chinese political influence in the region.  
Point #1— Enlargement into the Western Balkans demonstrates the strength of the EU’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
 Widely recognized as an international actor, the EU has played a crucial role in defining 
the future path for the Balkans. However, the EU does not simply want to be a global actor, it 
wants to be a global leader. To do this, the EU needs to not only assert dominance in its region, 
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but it also needs to demonstrate the strength of its foreign policy. The Western Balkans are 
located in a prime spot to demonstrate this strength. Since its inception, the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC), the precursor to the European Union, sought to prevent European 
wars through economic interdependency and multilateral cooperation. The inability for cohesive 
military action in the once ethnically fragmented and war-torn Balkan peninsula was a source of 
great embarrassment for the EU in the early 1990s. However, since the EU has committed itself 
to the Western Balkans, it has witnessed a serious and focused commitment to cooperation 
within the region.  The threat of future conflict is minimal, and for the most part each of the 
remaining Balkan Six are working together under the common goal of joining the EU. If and 
when the EU fulfills its promise of enlargement into the Western Balkans it will have not only 
united another key area of Europe, but also succeeded in stabilizing the region. Moreover, this 
endeavor will demonstrate to the world that the European Union has the capacity and the will to 
create and carry out a cohesive foreign-policy plan. 
Point #2— Enlargement into the Western Balkans introduces valuable partner states in the 
ongoing refugee crisis. 
 The ongoing refugee crisis remains one of Europe’s most significant unresolved 
problems. The sudden influx of migrants has left EU leaders scrambling for solutions and has 
resulted in the closure of numerous internal borders. The Western Balkans are crucial actors in 
this situation. During the peak of the European migration and refugee crisis, hundreds of 
thousands of asylum seekers and migrants arrived in the European Union via the Western 
Balkans.86 Key components of crisis management fell to non-EU states along the “Balkan 
                                                 
86 Greider, Alice. 2017. "Outsourcing Migration Management: The Role Of The Western 
Balkans In The European Refugee Crisis". Migrationpolicy.Org. 
   
 32 
Route”, primarily Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which consequently 
were not consulted on broader, European-wide responses.87 While the Balkan countries first 
opted to facilitate the safe movement of refugees through their territories to the north to pass on 
the responsibility, the pressure from EU member states ultimately resulted in a series of border 
controls and increasing restrictions on the flow of movement. This led to a sudden drop of 
immigrants entering Europe from the “Balkan Route”, and migrants still wishing to travel north 
were pushed into more dangerous and irregular channels. Additionally, thousands of migrants 
were left stranded in under-resourced camps and reception centers along the borders, primarily in 
Serbia and Bulgaria.88 Though this practice has little effect on the European Union, for countries 
still consolidating democratically and developing the rule of law, it has devastating implications. 
More specifically, the movement of hundreds of thousands of people has renewed dormant 
tensions between and within individual Balkan countries, while exacerbating strains between the 
Balkans as a region and the European Union.89 
 By enlarging into the Western Balkans, the EU faces an unparalleled opportunity to 
partner with the Balkan countries to implement a cohesive strategy and secure the “Balkan 
Route”. This policy would not only ensure that the Balkan states did not suffer setbacks from the 
pressure of increased migration, but it would also mitigate a humanitarian crisis by finding safer 
and more controlled passageways for refugee and migrant travelers. Rather than sending 
financial aid and expecting the newly developed Western Balkan states to handle the issue on 
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their own, enlargement creates an important partnership that equally shares the problem and the 
burden of finding a feasible solution.  
Point #3— Enlargement into the Western Balkans secures Europe’s geopolitical stance in 
the face of encroaching Russian/Asian political influence in the region. 
The Western Balkans occupy a special place in Russian foreign policy. For years Russia 
has continuously worked to exert influence in Southeast Europe, utilizing Serbia to “establish a 
friendly pocket on a hostile continent”.90 In addition to its cultural and historical ties with local 
Orthodox Slavs, the Russian leadership is still haunted by the Kosovo crisis and the NATO 
bombing campaign of Serbia. Currently, Russia is trying to align itself more closely with the 
region in order to diminish the growing influence of the European Union. Serbia, Montenegro 
and the Serbian part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republika Srpska, traditionally have ties with 
Russia. Over the years, natural gas supplies, infrastructure projects and Russian investments have 
reinforced these links91. While Europe remains the largest financial contributor in the Western 
Balkans, the subtle push by Russia to utilize a soft-power strategy to regain a sphere of influence 
in the region is a cause for concern. There is no answer to the deepening-widening matrix of the 
EU, but the EU “can only become a global player if it actively takes part in shaping the European 
neighborhood, and builds a geo-strategic dimension by giving the border countries a perspective 
for membership”.92 
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Ironically enough it was the Russians and their policies in the Balkans that triggered the 
alarm bells that spurred the European Union into action.93 While negotiations had at one point 
significantly slowed, the EU has recently pushed the Western Balkans to the top of their agenda 
and implemented a new campaign to incentivize the Balkan region. However, the European 
Union will not be able to reduce Russia’s influence in the region until all of the Western Balkan 
states are full members of the EU. Thus, it is critical that the Union continue its push for future 
enlargement into the Balkans to cement their geopolitical influence in the region and reclaim the 
Balkan peninsula as a vital part of Europe. As President of the European Commission, Jean-
Claude Juncker, stated, “investing in the stability and prosperity of the Western Balkans means 
investing in the security and future of our Union”.94 Simply put, it is imperative that the Western 
Balkans do not become so disillusioned with the West and its inability to match exaggerated 
expectations that many of them are willing to be attracted or lured by any alternative.95 The 
future of the Western Balkans is with Europe, and the EU needs to ensure that this promise 
becomes a reality.  
Furthermore, undoubtedly the EU is committed to the idea of enlargement into the 
Western Balkans. In fact, just recently the European Commission released the ‘the six flagship 
initiatives’ to support the transformation of the Western Balkan region.96 However, the changed 
approach towards enlargement in the Western Balkans has resulted in varied perceptions of the 
EU’s actions. More specifically, the addition of further political conditions and the emphasis on 
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the journey rather than the outcome of accession has affected the credibility and consistency of 
the strategy.97  
Ultimately, these perceptions are crucial to the overall enlargement prospects because “a 
credible perspective of EU membership creates a powerful incentive for fundamental reform of 
these societies”.98 Thus, while it is important to note that the ultimate responsibility lies with the 
countries of the Balkans themselves and their will to introduce the necessary reforms, it is in the 
interest of the EU to facilitate good relations and ensure that their promises of accession are 
perceived as credible. Agreed objectives, common criteria, individual merits, and accession 
target dates are possible only once it is clear that progress has been achieved— but progress is 
more likely to occur when clear rewards and incentives are made available along the way. The 
Western Balkans are motivated to action by the prospect of one day becoming official members 
of the European Union, but this enthusiasm will only last for as long as their goal remains in 
sight. While there is no time limit on the accession process, the longer these countries go without 
seeing any reward for their efforts, the less political motivation they will have to keep making 
changes.   
VII. A Case for Continued European Enlargement— How Europe Must Frame the 
Process: 
 
While it is crucial to analyze what the Balkans can contribute to the European Project, it is 
also important to understand the factors that Europe should prioritize when shaping their final 
decision: the growing influence of China in Eastern Europe, the role of public opinion in the 
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European Union, and the potential negative impact further enlargement might have on the EU’s 
ability to implement a cohesive foreign policy strategy.  
First, the European Union must not underestimate the increasing role of China when they 
make their final decision. Although Europe appears to be more concerned by Russia’s historical 
influence in the Balkan region, the evolution of Sino-European relations is something that 
Europe must take note of. In many ways, this developing new relationship has the potential to 
become one of the most dynamic international relationships of the 21st century, but it is not 
without its flaws. More specifically, China’s recent push to involve itself in Europe’s regional 
politics through their “One Belt, One Road” initiative— offering money to rebuild roads and 
infrastructure in some of Europe’s poorest countries— has received caustic reviews from EU 
officials. At a time when the EU is facing an uphill battle between nationalist movements, 
growing Euroscepticism, and an east-west divide, the last thing the Union needs is a third-party 
actor coming in an exploiting these problems. Though China argues that this has never been the 
country’s goal, many in the EU are skeptical— especially with China’s recent interest in Eastern 
Europe. One such example of this is China’s 16+1, “a grouping of 16 central and eastern 
European countries led by China”.99  While countries like Hungary, Serbia, and Poland are 
hailing the approach as a “tremendous opportunity” and an “Eastward Opening”, EU officials are 
concerned that it could lead to an exploitation of Europe by Beijing.100 Thus, the European 
Union must carefully assess the risks of allowing China to continue influencing the Balkans 
states financially and politically as it moves forward in the accession process.  
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Next, the EU must find a way to balance the desires of the organization with the views of the 
public. Since its creation, the European Union has been criticized for its lack of democratic 
legitimacy. Its formal decision-making process is insulated from the ebbs and flows of popular 
opinion, but that does not mean that it shouldn’t be aware of the overall public opinion of 
member states, particularly in regard to the enlargement process. As enlargement and integration 
efforts become more heavily dominated by the individual agendas of EU member states, the role 
of public opinion becomes crucial in implementing successful policies. If the Union does not 
find ways to mitigate rising fears and Euroscepticism around Europe, then it will not be able to 
fully integrate the Balkan states into the European Union. There is no general consensus in the 
EU about whether or not the EU should continue its enlargement push into the Balkan states; 
however, EU officials must be aware of the growing divide between the top and bottom of its 
organization or face the consequences of future fragmentation. 
Finally, the European Union must acknowledge the overall risks of enlarging into the various 
Balkan states. More specifically, while enlarging into the Balkans might immediately enhance 
Europe’s global standing as a world player, the sudden increase in member states might hurt the 
organizations ability to enact cohesive foreign policy strategies in the future. Sometimes, bigger 
isn’t always better. More members inherently means more voices, more national interests, and 
more opinions to consider. The Union of 28 is already a slow-moving organization when it 
comes to wide-sweeping decisions, and adding six new members— each with their own 
problems and rivalries— might do little to help the overall foreign impact of the EU in the future. 
Thus, it is important that the European Union ease into this transition with careful consideration 
to ensure that the new Balkan member states have the ability to fully integrate into the Union 
without weighing it down.  
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Enlargement into the Balkans presents the European Union with a very delicate situation that 
must be handled with a keen sense of diplomacy and statesmanship. If the EU is successful, this 
particular enlargement has the power to reshape Europe’s standing in the world. It would 
demonstrate the evolution of the Union’s commitment to a cohesive and effective foreign policy 
as well as its ability to resolve regional tensions and contribute to the state-building process of 
post-conflict states. However, if the European Union fails, it will be another blow to the Union’s 
already fracturing influence. The European Union promised the Balkans that their future was 
with Europe without fully considering the lasting implications of this promise, and now, in spite 
of the problems enlargement into this region presents, the EU must find a way resolve the Balkan 




As a whole, enlargement is both a driver of integration and an integral part of the 
European Union’s security policy. Though the EU sits at a critical tipping point, it is imperative 
that the Union does not shy away from its previous commitments to further enlargement, 
particularly regarding the Western Balkan states. For years, the leadership of the European 
Union has reaffirmed its commitment to the Balkan region, but it has failed to follow through on 
these promises with anything other than financial support and political strategies. In the 2017 
State of the Union, European Commission President Jean-Claude Junker stated: 
“If we want more stability in our neighborhood, then we must maintain a credible 
enlargement prospective for the Western Balkans. It is clear that there will be no further 
enlargement during the mandate of this Commission and this Parliament. No candidate is ready. 
But thereafter the European Union will be greater than 27 in number Accession candidates must 
give the rule of law, justice, and fundamental rights utmost priority in the negotiations.”101 
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Clearly, European perspective of the Western Balkans is full of hope and promise, but up 
until recently the intent has been lacking. While it is up to the regional leaders to implement 
political and economic reforms within their respective countries to meet the criteria for EU 
membership, it is also up to the EU to take every possible measure to aid these countries in the 
transition. The enlargement cannot be a one-sided endeavor. Not only does the EU need to strike 
a balance between regional cooperation and individual progress within the Balkans, but it also 
needs to strengthen its commitment to the region by setting out reasonable target dates for 
accession and facilitating a working partnership with the Western Balkans. There is a lot of work 
to be done on both sides, but if the EU truly wishes to begin reforming the institutional and 
political framework of the Union, it can heed its own advice and “assume responsibility for 
making this historical opportunity a reality”.102  
The Western Balkans are a part of Europe. They share a common heritage and history 
with the people of Europe, and their future is defined by shared opportunities and challenges. 
However, the prospect of EU membership for the Western Balkans is so much more than 
geographical proximity and cultural necessity. Enlargement is a geostrategic investment, and the 
Western Balkans fulfill very distinct political, security, and economic interests. The EU has an 
opportunity to make up for their failed intervention in the 1990s and utilize its newfound 
influence to promote democracy, the rule of law, and the respect for fundamental rights. They 
have an opportunity to promote stability and further unite continental Europe, and the Balkans 
are excited to one day join the EU— but this sentiment may not last forever. Thus, it is 
imperative that the EU not miss an opportunity to use this region as a part of a larger strategy to 
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strengthen the Union. Simply put, the Western Balkan states are not ready to join the European 
Union at this time, but that must not deter the European Union utilizing this enlargement 
opportunity to reshape the direction of Europe and push for deeper integration policies.  
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